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Abstract
We consider an imperfectly competitive loan market in which a local relationship lender
has an information advantage vis-à-vis distant transaction lenders. Competitive pressure
from the transaction lenders prevents the local lender from extracting the full surplus from
projects, so that she ineﬃciently rejects marginally proﬁtable projects. Collateral mitigates
the ineﬃciency by increasing the local lender’s payoﬀ from precisely those marginal projects
that she ineﬃciently rejects. The model predicts that, controlling for observable borrower
risk, collateralized loans are more likely to default ex post, which is consistent with the
empirical evidence. The model also predicts that borrowers for whom local lenders have a
relatively smaller information advantage face higher collateral requirements, and that tech-
nological innovations that narrow the information advantage of local lenders, such as small
business credit scoring, lead to a greater use of collateral in lending relationships.
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11. Introduction
About 80% of small business loans in the United States are secured by collateral. In dollar
terms, the number is even close to 90% (Avery, Bostic, and Samolyk, 1998). Understanding
the role of collateral is important, not only because of its widespread use, but also because
of its implications for monetary policy. Under the “ﬁnancial accelerator” view of monetary
policy transmission, a tightening of monetary policy and the associated increase in interest rates
impairs collateral values, making it more diﬃcult for borrowers to obtain funds, which reduces
investment and economic growth.1
Over the past decade, small business lending in the United States has witnessed an “infor-
mation revolution” (Petersen and Rajan, 2002). Small business lending has historically been a
local activity based on soft information culled from close contacts with borrowers and knowledge
of local business conditions. In recent years, this image has changed. Advances in information
technology, in particular the widespread adoption of small business credit scoring, have made
it possible to underwrite transaction loans based solely on publicly available hard information
without meeting the borrower.2 As a result, local relationship lenders have faced increasing com-
petitive pressure from arm’s-length transaction lenders, especially large banks (Hannan, 2003;
Frame, Padhi, and Woosley, 2004; Berger, Frame, and Miller, 2005).
These developments raise several important questions. As the competitive pressure from
transaction lenders increases, what will happen to collateral requirements? Will local lenders
reduce their collateral requirements, implying that collateral may lose some of its importance for
small business lending? Or will collateral requirements increase? And who will be aﬀected the
most by the changes in collateral requirements: businesses for which local lenders have a strong
information advantage vis-à-vis transaction lenders, or businesses for which the information
advantage of local lenders is relatively weak?
This paper proposes a novel theory of collateral that can address these questions. We consider
an imperfectly competitive loan market in which a local lender has an information advantage
vis-à-vis distant transaction lenders. The local lender has privileged access to soft private infor-
1See Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) for details.
2T w op i e c e so fh a r di n f o r m a t i on are especially important: the business owner’s personal credit history, obtained
from consumer credit bureaus, and information on the business itself, obtained from mercantile credit information
exchanges, such as Dun & Bradstreet. While credit scoring has been used for some time in consumer lending, it
has only recently been applied to small business lending after credit analysts found out that the business owner’s
personal credit history is highly predictive of the loan repayment prospects of the business. For an overview of
small business credit scoring, see Mester (1997) and Berger and Frame (2005).
2mation that enables her to make a more precise estimate of the borrower’s default likelihood.
This gives the local lender a competitive advantage, which generally allows her to attract the
borrower.3 Nevertheless, that there is competition from transaction lenders is important, as
it provides the borrower with a positive outside option that the local lender must match. To
attract the borrower, the local lender must oﬀer him a share of the project’s cash ﬂows, which
distorts her credit decision: As the local lender incurs the full project costs but receives only a
fraction of the project’s cash ﬂows, she only accepts projects with expected cash ﬂows that are
suﬃciently greater than the project costs. In other words, the local lender rejects projects with
a small but positive net present value (NPV).
Collateral can mitigate the ineﬃciency.4 The fundamental role of collateral in our model is
to ﬂatten the local lender’s payoﬀ function. When collateral is added, the local lender’s payoﬀ
exceeds the project cash ﬂow in low cash-ﬂow states. Of course, the local lender’s payoﬀ in high
cash-ﬂow states must be reduced, or else the borrower’s participation constraint is violated.
However, as low cash ﬂows are more likely under low-NPV projects, the overall eﬀect is that
the local lender’s payoﬀ from low-NPV projects increases, and therefore from precisely those
projects that she ineﬃciently rejects. Hence, collateral improves the local lender’s incentives to
accept marginally positive projects, making her credit decision more eﬃcient.
We consider two implications of the “information revolution” in small business lending, both
of which increase the competitive pressure from transaction lenders. The ﬁrst implication is
that the information advantage of local lenders vis-à-vis transaction lenders appears to have
narrowed. Small business credit-scoring models can predict the likelihood that a loan applicant
will default fairly accurately, thus reducing the information uncertainty associated with small
business loans made to borrowers located far away (Mester, 1997). In our model, a narrowing
of the local lender’s information advantage vis-à-vis transaction lenders forces the local lender
3This is consistent with Petersen and Rajan’s (1994, 2002) observation that 95% of the smallest ﬁrms in their
sample borrow from a single lender (1994), which is generally a local bank (2002). See also Petersen and Rajan
(1995), who argue that “credit markets for small ﬁrms are local,” and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004), who
refer to “direct evidence of the informational disadvantage of distant lenders in Italy.” As in our model, Hauswald
and Marquez (2003, 2005) and Almazan (2002) assume that lenders who are located closer to a borrower have
better information about the borrower. Our notion of imperfect loan market competition diﬀers from Thakor
(1996), who considers symmetric competition between multiple lenders.
4That the local lender’s credit decision is based on soft private information is crucial for the ineﬃciency, and
hence also for our argument for collateral. If the information were contractible, the local lender could commit to
the ﬁrst-best credit decision, even if it meant committing to a decision rule that is ex-post suboptimal. Likewise,
if the information were observable but non-veriﬁable, the ineﬃciency could be eliminated through bargaining.
3to reduce the loan rate, implying that borrowers receive a larger share of the project cash ﬂows.
To minimize distortions in her credit decision, the local lender raises the collateral requirement.
Our model thus predicts that, following the widespread adoption of small business credit scoring
since the 1990s, the use of collateral in lending relationships should increase. We also obtain
a cross-sectional prediction, namely, that borrowers for whom the local lender has a relatively
smaller information advantage should face higher collateral requirements. Consistent with this
prediction, Petersen and Rajan (2002) ﬁnd that small business borrowers who are located farther
away from their local lender are more likely to pledge collateral.
The second implication of the “information revolution” that we consider is that the direct
costs of underwriting transaction loans have decreased. Similar to above, this increases the
competitive pressure from transaction lenders, implying that the local lender must reduce the
loan rate and raise the collateral requirement. Our model thus predicts that technological
innovations that reduce the costs of underwriting transaction loans lead to a greater use of
collateral in lending relationships. Moreover, the increase in collateral requirement should be
weaker for borrowers for whom the local lender has a greater information advantage.
As the sole role of collateral in our model is to minimize distortions in credit decisions based
on soft private information, collateral has no meaningful role to play in loans underwritten by
transaction lenders. While the vast majority of small business loans in the United States are
collateralized, small business loans made by transaction lenders on the basis of credit scoring
tend to be unsecured (Zuckerman, 1996; Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley, 2001; Frame, Padhi,
and Woosley, 2004).
We are unaware of empirical studies that examine how an increase in competitive pressure
from arm’s-length transaction lenders aﬀects the use of collateral in local lending relationships.
However, Jiménez and Saurina (2004) and Jiménez, Salas, and Saurina (2005) provide some
indirect support for our model. Using Spanish data, they ﬁnd a positive relation between
collateral and bank competition, as measured by the Herﬁndahl index. Moreover, Jiménez, Salas,
and Saurina (2006) ﬁnd that this positive eﬀect of competition is weaker when the duration of
borrower relationships is shorter, which is consistent with our model if the information advantage
of local lenders increases with the duration of borrower relationships.
To the best of our knowledge, related models of imperfect loan market competition, such as
Boot and Thakor (2000), who consider competition between transaction lenders and relationship
lenders, or Hauswald and Marquez (2003, 2005), who examine how information technology
aﬀects competition between diﬀerentially informed lenders, do not consider collateral. Likewise,
4Inderst and Mueller (2006), who analyze the optimal security design in a setting similar to
the one in this paper, do not consider collateral. On the other hand, to the extent that they
consider loan market competition, theoretical models of collateral do not consider imperfect loan
market competition between arm’s-length transaction lenders and local relationship lenders, thus
generating empirical predictions that are diﬀerent from this paper. For example, Besanko and
Thakor (1987a) and Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001) both compare a monopolistic with a
perfectly competitive loan market and ﬁnd that collateral is used only in the latter. Closer in
spirit to our model, Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) consider an oligopolistic loan market
with horizontally diﬀerentiated banks, showing that collateral requirements may either increase
or decrease as bank competition increases.5
In addition to examining the role of imperfect loan market competition for collateral, our
model also makes predictions for a given borrower-lender relationship, that is, holding loan
market competition constant. For instance, our model predicts that observably riskier bor-
rowers should pledge more collateral and that–holding observable borrower risk constant–
collateralized loans are more likely to default ex post. Both predictions are consistent with the
empirical evidence: Observably riskier borrowers appear to pledge more collateral (Leeth and
Scott, 1989; Berger and Udell, 1995; Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe, 2000), and–controlling for
observable borrower risk–collateralized loans appear to be riskier in the sense that they default
more often (Jiménez and Saurina, 2004; Jiménez, Salas, and Saurina, 2005) and have worse
performance in terms of payments past due and non-accruals (Berger and Udell, 1990).
The above two predictions do not easily follow from existing models of collateral. Adverse
selection models (Bester, 1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1987; Besanko and Thakor, 1987a, 1987b)
predict that safer borrowers within an observationally identical risk pool pledge more collateral.
Likewise, moral-hazard models (Chan and Thakor, 1987; Boot and Thakor, 1994) are based
on the premise that posting collateral improves borrowers’ incentives to work hard, reducing
their likelihood of default. A notable exception is Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991), who combine
observable borrower quality with moral hazard. Like this paper, they ﬁnd that observably riskier
borrowers may pledge more collateral, and that collateralized loans may be riskier ex post.
Intuitively, if borrower quality and eﬀort are substitutes, low-quality borrowers post collateral
5Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) consider a spatial competition model with two banks located at the
endpoints of a line. Entrepreneurs incur travel costs that depend on the distance they must travel to each bank.
Unlike this paper, entrepreneurs are better informed than banks, while the two banks have the same information
about entrepreneurs.
5to commit to higher eﬀort. While this reduces the default likelihood of low-quality borrowers,
the likelihood remains higher than it is for high-quality borrowers due to the greater relative
importance of borrower quality for default risk.6
Most existing models of collateral assume agency problems on the part of the borrower.
Notable exceptions are Rajan and Winton (1995) and Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001).
Rajan and Winton (1995) examine the eﬀects of collateral on the lender’s ex-post monitoring
incentives. Monitoring is valuable because it allows the lender to claim additional collateral if
the ﬁrm is in distress. In Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001), lenders protected by collateral
screen too little. In our model, by contrast, collateral and screening are complements: Without
screening, there would be no role for collateral.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model. Section
3 focuses on a given borrower-lender relationship. It shows why collateral is optimal in our
model, derives comparative static results, and discusses related empirical literature. Section
4 considers robustness issues. Section 5 examines how technological innovations that increase
the competitive pressure from transaction lenders aﬀect the use of collateral in local lending
relationships. The related empirical literature is discussed along with our main predictions.
Section 6 concludes. Appendix A shows that our basic argument for collateral extends to a
continuum of cash ﬂows. All proofs are in Appendix B.
2. The model
2.1. Basic setup
A ﬁrm (“the borrower”) has an indivisible project with ﬁxed investment cost k>0.7 The
project cash ﬂow x is veriﬁable and can be either high (x = xh) or low (x = xl).T h e t w o
cash-ﬂow model is the simplest framework to illustrate our argument for collateral. Appendix A
shows that our argument straightforwardly extends to a setting with a continuum of cash ﬂows.
The borrower has pledgeable assets w,w h e r exl + w<k , implying that the project cannot be
ﬁnanced by issuing a safe claim. The risk-free interest rate is normalized to zero.
6There are two fundamental diﬀerences between Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) and this paper. First, the
role of collateral in Boot, Thakor, and Udell’s model is to mitigate agency problems on the part of the borrower,
while in our model, it is to mitigate incentive problems on the part of the lender. Second, Boot, Thakor, and
Udell consider a perfectly competitive loan market in which lenders earn zero expected proﬁts, while we consider
an imperfectly competitive loan market in which better informed local lenders earn positive expected proﬁts.
7With few exceptions (for example, Besanko and Thakor, 1987b), existing models of collateral all assume a
ﬁxed project size.
62.2. Lender types and information structure
There are two types of lenders: a local lender and distant transaction lenders. Transaction
lenders are perfectly competitive and provide arm’s-length ﬁnancing based solely on publicly
available hard information.8 Given this information, the project’s success probability is Pr(x =
xh): =p ∈ (0,1). The corresponding expected cash ﬂow is µ := pxh +( 1− p)xl.
The fundamental diﬀerence between the local lender and transaction lenders is that the local
lender has privileged access to soft information, allowing her to make a more precise estimate
of the project’s success probability. For example, the local lender may already be familiar with
the borrower from previous lending relationships. But even if the local lender has had no prior
lending relationship with the borrower, managing the borrower’s accounts, familiarity with local
business conditions, and experience with similar businesses in the region may provide the local
lender with valuable information that the transaction lenders do not have.9
We assume that the local lender’s assessment of the borrower’s project can be represented
by a continuous variable s ∈ [0,1] with associated success probability ps. In practice, s and ps
may be viewed as the local lender’s internal rating of the borrower. The success probability ps is
increasing in s, implying that the conditional expected project cash ﬂow µs := psxh +(1−ps)xl
is also increasing in s. Because the local lender’s assessment is based on soft information that is
diﬃcult to verify vis-à-vis outsiders, we assume that s and ps are private information.10 As for
the borrower, we assume that he lacks the skill and expertise to replicate the local lender’s project
assessment. After all, professional lenders have specialized expertise, which is why they are in
the project-evaluation business.11 In sum, neither the transaction lenders (for lack of access to
8The term “transaction lending” is due to Boot and Thakor (2000). In their model, as in ours, transaction
lenders are passive in the sense that they create no additional value other than providing arm’s-length ﬁnancing.
9As Mester (1997) writes, “the local presence gives the banker a good knowledge of the area, which is thought
to be useful in the credit decision. Small businesses are likely to have deposit accounts at the small bank in
town, and the information the bank can gain by observing the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows can give the bank an information
advantage in lending to these businesses.”
10As Brunner, Krahnen, and Weber (2000) argue, “internal ratings should therefore be seen as private informa-
tion. Typically, banks do not inform their customers of the internal ratings or the implied PODs [probabilities of
default], nor do they publicize the criteria and methods used in deriving them.” See also Boot (2000), who writes
that “the information [collected by relationship lenders] remains conﬁdential (proprietary).”
11See Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001). If the local lender also holds loans from other local businesses, she
may also know more than any individual borrower, because she knows where the borrower’s local competitors are
headed (Boot and Thakor, 2000). Consistent with the notion that professional lenders are better than borrowers
at estimating default risk, Reid (1991) ﬁnds that bank-ﬁnanced ﬁrms are more likely to survive than ﬁrms funded
7soft information) nor the borrower (for lack of expertise) can observe s or ps. Of course, the
expected value of ps is commonly known: Consistency of beliefs requires that p =
R 1
0 psf(s)ds,
where f(s) is the density associated with s.
To make the local lender’s access to soft information valuable, we assume that µ1 >kand
µ0 <k .That is, the project’s NPV is positive for high s and negative for low s.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
having access to soft information allows the local lender to distinguish between positive- and
negative-NPV projects. By contrast, transaction lenders can only observe the project’s NPV
based on publicly available hard information, which is µ − k.
2.3. Financial contracts
A ﬁnancial contract speciﬁes repayments tl ≤ xl and th ≤ xh out of the project’s cash ﬂows,
an amount of collateral C ≤ w to be pledged by the borrower, and repayments cl ≤ C and ch ≤ C
out of the pledged assets. The total repayment made by the borrower is thus Rl := tl +cl in the
bad state and Rh := th + ch in the good state.12
Given that the local lender has interim private information, a standard solution is to have the
local lender oﬀer an incentive-compatible menu of contracts, from which she chooses a contract
after she has evaluated the borrower’s project. Introducing such a menu is suboptimal in our
model (see also Section 4.2). Rather, it is uniquely optimal to have the local lender oﬀer a single
contract, and then have her accept or reject the borrower on the basis of this contract. This is
consistent with the notion that in many loan markets, credit decisions are plain accept-or-reject
decisions: Loan applicants are typically either accepted under the terms of the initial contract
oﬀer or rejected (Saunders and Thomas, 2001).
2.4. Timeline and competitive structure of the loan market
There are three dates: τ =0 ,τ=1 , and τ =2 . In τ =0 , the local lender and the
transaction lenders make competing oﬀers. If the borrower goes to a transaction lender, he
obtains ﬁnancing under the terms of the initial oﬀer. As the transaction lenders only have
access to public information, making an oﬀer to the borrower is de facto equivalent to accepting
by family investors.
12This excludes the possibility that the local lender “buys” the project before evaluating it. Using a standard
argument, we assume that up-front payments from the local lender would attract a potentially large pool of
fraudulent borrowers, or “ﬂy-by-night operators,” who have fake projects (see Rajan, 1992). This argument also
rules out that the local lender pays a penalty to the borrower if the loan is not approved.
8him. If the borrower goes to the local lender, the local lender evaluates the borrower’s project,
which takes place in τ =1 . If the borrower is accepted, he obtains ﬁnancing under the terms
of the initial oﬀer.13 If the borrower is rejected, he may still seek ﬁnancing from transaction
lenders. In τ =2 , the project’s cash ﬂow is realized, and the borrower makes the contractually
stipulated repayment.
To ensure the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium, we assume that the transaction lenders
can observe whether the borrower has previously sought credit from the local lender.14 Given
that the transaction lenders are perfectly competitive, they can thus oﬀer a “fresh” borrower–a
borrower who has not previously sought credit from the local lender–the full project NPV based
on hard information. In contrast, we assume that the local lender makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer
that maximizes her own proﬁts, subject to matching the borrower’s outside option from going
to transaction lenders. Eﬀectively, we thus give the local lender all of the bargaining power.
Section 4.1 shows that our results extend to arbitrary distributions of bargaining powers. This
also includes the other polar case in which the initial contract oﬀer maximizes the borrower’s
expected proﬁts. Moreover, Section 4.2 shows that the local lender and the borrower will not
renegotiate the initial contract after the project evaluation.
3. Optimal credit decision and ﬁnancial contract
In our analysis of loan market competition in Section 5, we show that the local lender may
be sometimes unable to attract the borrower. Formally, there may be no solution to the local
lender’s maximization problem that would satisfy the borrower’s participation constraint. In
this section, we solve the local lender’s maximization problem assuming that a solution exists.
We ﬁrst characterize the general properties of the local lender’s optimal credit decision (Section
3.1) and ﬁnancial contract (Section 3.2). We then examine how the optimal contract depends
on the borrower’s pledgeable assets (Section 3.3). We conclude with some comparative static
13Section 4.2 revisits our assumption that the local lender makes an oﬀer before the project evaluation. At
least in the case of small business lending, lenders appear to make conditional ex-ante oﬀers specifying what loan
terms borrowers receive if the loan application is approved. At Chase Manhattan, for instance, applicants for
small business loans are initially shown a pricing chart explaining in detail what interest rate they get if their
loan is approved. A copy of the pricing chart is available from the authors.
14On the nonexistence of pure-strategy equilibria in loan markets with diﬀerentially informed lenders, see
Broecker (1990). When a borrower applies for a loan, the lender typically inquires into the borrower’s credit
history, which is subsequently documented in the borrower’s credit report. Hence, potential future lenders can see
if, when, and from whom the borrower has previously sought credit (Mester, 1997; Jappelli and Pagano, 2002).
9exercises and a discussion of the relevant empirical literature (Section 3.4).
3.1. General properties of the optimal credit decision
To obtain a benchmark, we ﬁrst derive the ﬁrst-best optimal credit decision. Given that
µs <kfor low s and µs >kfor high s, and given that µs is increasing and continuous in s,
there exists a unique ﬁrst-best cutoﬀ sFB ∈ (0,1) given by µsFB = k such that the project NPV
is positive if s>s FB, zero if s = sFB, and negative if s<s FB.T h eﬁrst-best credit decision is
thus to accept the project if and only if s ≥ sFB or, equivalently, if and only if
ps ≥ psFB :=
k − xl
xh − xl
. (1)
We next derive the local lender’s privately optimal credit decision. The local lender accepts
the project if and only if her conditional expected payoﬀ
Us(Rl,R h): =psRh +( 1− ps)Rl
equals or exceeds k. We can immediately exclude contracts under which the project is either
accepted or rejected for all s ∈ [0,1]. As Rl = tl + cl ≤ xl + w<k ,t h i si m p l i e st h a tRh >k .
Given that ps is increasing in s, this in turn implies that Us(Rl,R h) is strictly increasing in s,
which ﬁnally implies that the local lender accepts the project if and only if s ≥ s∗(Rl,R h),w h e r e
s∗(Rl,R h) ∈ (0,1) is unique and given by Us∗(Rl,R h)=k.L i k e t h e ﬁrst-best optimal credit
decision, the local lender’s privately optimal credit decision thus follows a cutoﬀ rule: The local
lender accepts the project if and only if the project assessment is suﬃciently positive. We can
again alternatively express the optimal credit decision in terms of a critical success probability,
whereby the local lender accepts the project if and only if
ps ≥ ps∗ :=
k − Rl
Rh − Rl
. (2)
The following lemma summarizes these results.
Lemma 1. The ﬁrst-best optimal credit decision is to accept the borrower if and only if ps ≥
psFB, where psFB is given by Eq. (1). The local lender’s privately optimal credit decision is to
accept the borrower if and only if ps ≥ ps∗, where ps∗ is given by Eq. (2).
3.2. General properties of the optimal ﬁnancial contract
The following lemma simpliﬁes the analysis further.
10Lemma 2. Borrowers who are initially attracted by the local lender but rejected after the project
evaluation cannot obtain ﬁnancing elsewhere.
The proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix B shows that the project’s expected NPV conditional on
being rejected by the local lender is non-positive, implying that the transaction lenders refrain
from making an oﬀer.15 To see the intuition, note that the local lender makes positive expected
proﬁts: If s<s ∗, she rejects the borrower; if s = s∗, she makes zero proﬁt( Us = k);a n di fs>s ∗,
she makes a positive proﬁt( Us >k ), which represents her informational rent from making her
credit decision under private information. If the local lender can attract the borrower while
making positive expected proﬁts, this implies that she must create additional surplus, which in
turn implies that rejected projects must disappear from the market: If rejected projects could
still obtain ﬁnancing, implying that all projects would eventually be ﬁnanced (by someone),
then no additional surplus would be created.
Equipped with Lemmas 1 and 2, we can set up the local lender’s maximization problem.
The local lender chooses Rl and Rh to maximize her expected payoﬀ
U(Rl,Rh): =
Z 1
s∗
[Us (Rl,R h) − k]f(s)ds,
subject to the constraint Us∗(Rl,R h)=k characterizing the local lender’s privately optimal
credit decision (see Lemma 1), and the borrower’s participation constraint
V (Rl,Rh): =
Z 1
s∗
Vs(Rl,R h)f(s)ds ≥ V, (3)
where
Vs(Rl,R h): =µs − Us (Rl,R h)=ps(xh − Rh)+( 1− ps)(xl − Rl)
represents the borrower’s expected payoﬀ conditional on s.
Two comments are in order. First, the borrower’s payoﬀ in Eq. (3) is zero with probability
F(s∗), which reﬂects the insight from Lemma 2 that rejected borrowers cannot obtain ﬁnancing
elsewhere. Second, given that the maximum that the transaction lenders can oﬀer is the full
project NPV based on hard information, it holds that V =m a x {0,µ− k}.
15Recall that the transaction lenders can infer from the borrower’s credit report whether the borrower has
previously sought credit from the local lender. In a famous anecdote, albeit in the context of consumer credit
scoring, Lawrence Lindsay, then governor of the Federal Reserve System, was denied a Toys ‘R’ Us credit card by
a fully automated credit-scoring system because he had too many inquiries into his credit report, stemming from
previous credit card and loan applications (Mester, 1997).
11By standard arguments, the borrower’s participation constraint must bind, implying that
the local lender receives any surplus in excess of V . As the residual claimant, the local lender
designs a contract inducing herself to make a credit decision that is as eﬃcient as possible. As
the following proposition shows, the optimal contract stipulates a positive amount of collateral.
Proposition 1. There exists a uniquely optimal ﬁnancial contract. If V> 0, the borrower
pledges a positive amount of collateral C ∈ (0,w], so that the local lender receives Rl = xl + C
in the bad state and Rh ∈ (Rl,x h) in the good state. If V =0 , the local lender receives the full
project cash ﬂow, that is, Rl = xl and Rh = xh.16
The case where V =0is special, arising only because we assumed that the local lender
has all of the bargaining power. If the borrower had positive bargaining power, we would have
V> 0 even if the borrower’s outside option were zero, that is, even if µ−k ≤ 0 (see Section 4.1).
Clearly, if V =0 , there is no role for collateral: The local lender can extract the full project
cash ﬂow, which implies that her credit decision is ﬁrst-best optimal.
The interesting case is that in which V> 0. In this case, the local lender cannot extract the
full project cash ﬂow, implying that her expected payoﬀ Us (Rl,R h) is less than the expected
project cash ﬂow µs for all s ∈ [0,1]. In particular, UsFB(Rl,R h) <µ sFB = k, that is, the local
lender does not break even at s = sFB. As Us (Rl,R h) strictly increases in s,t h i si m p l i e st h a t
s∗ >s FB, that is, the local lender’s privately optimal cutoﬀ exceeds the ﬁrst-best cutoﬀ.I n
other words, the local lender rejects projects with a low but positive NPV.
Collateral can mitigate the ineﬃciency. Firstly, collateral should optimally be added when
the project’s cash ﬂow is low, not when it is high, implying that Rl >x l. T h i si m p r o v e st h e
local lender’s payoﬀ primarily from low-NPV projects, and thus from precisely those projects
that she ineﬃciently rejects. Adding collateral when the project’s cash ﬂow is high, that is,
when Rh >x h, would improve the local lender’s payoﬀ primarily from high-NPV projects that
are accepted anyway. It is therefore optimal to ﬂatten the local lender’s payoﬀ function by
adding collateral in the bad state, thereby increasing Rl, and by simultaneously decreasing Rh
to satisfy the borrower’s participation constraint. Arguably, the two payoﬀ adjustments have
opposite eﬀects on the local lender’s cutoﬀ s∗ : Increasing Rl pushes s∗ down, and thus closer
to sFB, while decreasing Rh drags s∗ away from sFB. And yet, the overall eﬀect is that s∗ is
16The optimal repayment Rh i nt h eg o o ds t a t ei fV> 0 is uniquely determined by the borrower’s binding
participation constraint (3) after inserting Rl = xl + C.I nc a s eo fi n d i ﬀerence, we stipulate that repayments are
ﬁrst made out of the project’s cash ﬂow.
12pushed down.
To see why s∗ is pushed down, suppose that the local lender’s optimal cutoﬀ is currently
s∗ =ˆ s, and suppose that the local lender increases Rl and simultaneously decreases Rh such that,
conditional on s ≥ ˆ s, the borrower’s expected payoﬀ
R 1
ˆ s Vs(Rl,R h)f(s)ds remains unchanged.
While on average–that is, over the interval [ˆ s,1]–the borrower remains equally well oﬀ,h i s
conditional expected payoﬀ Vs(Rl,R h) is higher at high values of s ∈ [ˆ s,1] and lower at low values
of s ∈ [ˆ s,1]. The opposite holds for the local lender. Her conditional expected payoﬀ Us(Rl,R h)
is now higher at low values of s ∈ [ˆ s,1] and lower at high values of s ∈ [ˆ s,1]. Consequently,
the local lender’s payoﬀ function has ﬂattened over the interval [ˆ s,1]. Most importantly, her
conditional expected payoﬀ Us(Rl,R h) is now greater than k at s =ˆ s, which implies that ˆ s is
no longer the optimal cutoﬀ. Indeed, as Us(Rl,R h) is strictly increasing in s, the (new) optimal
cutoﬀ must be lower than ˆ s, implying that s∗ is pushed down.17
Similar to the eﬀect on the local lender’s optimal cutoﬀ s∗,w h e nv i e w e di ni s o l a t i o n ,t h e
increase in Rl and decrease in Rh have opposite eﬀects on the local lender’s proﬁt. The overall
eﬀect, however, is that the local lender’s proﬁt increases. Intuitively, that s∗ is pushed down
toward sFB implies that additional surplus is created. As the borrower’s participation constraint
holds with equality, this additional surplus accrues to the local lender.
For convenience, we write the optimal repayment in the good state in terms of an optimal
loan rate r, where Rh := (1 + r)k. As the risk-free interest rate is normalized to zero, the loan
rate also represents the required risk premium. By Proposition 1, the optimal contract is then
fully characterized by two variables, r and C.
3.3. Optimal credit decision and ﬁnancial contract as a function of the borrower’s pledgeable
assets
Proposition 1 qualitatively characterizes the optimal contract. It remains to derive the
speciﬁc solution to the local lender’s maximization problem, that is, the speciﬁc optimal loan
rate and collateral as a function of the borrower’s pledgeable assets w. As discussed previously,
if V =0 , the ﬁrst best can be attained trivially without the help of collateral. In what follows,
we focus on the nontrivial case in which V> 0.
17The proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix B shows that the increase in Rl and simultaneous decrease in Rh
analyzed here is feasible–that is, it does not violate the borrower’s participation constraint. In fact, both the
local lender and the borrower are strictly better oﬀ when the optimal cutoﬀ is pushed down. The local lender
c a nt h e r e f o r e ,i naﬁnal step, increase Rh further, thus pushing the optimal cutoﬀ even further down, until the
borrower’s participation constraint binds.
13There are two sub-cases. If the borrower has insuﬃcient pledgeable assets to attain the
ﬁrst best, then the uniquely optimal contract stipulates that he pledges all of his assets as
collateral. If the borrower has suﬃcient pledgeable assets, then there exist unique values CFB
and rFB, which are jointly determined by the borrower’s binding participation constraint (3)
with V = µ − k and the condition that
psFB(1 + rFB)k +( 1− psFB)(xl + CFB)=k, (4)
where psFB is deﬁned in Eq. (1). Solving these two equations yields unique values
CFB =
(k − xl)(µ − k)
R 1
sFB(µs − k)f(s)ds
(5)
and
rFB =
1
k
∙
xh − CFB
xh − k
k − xl
¸
− 1. (6)
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If the borrower has suﬃcient pledgeable assets w ≥ CFB, then the ﬁr s tb e s tc a n
be implemented with the uniquely optimal ﬁnancial contract (rFB,C FB) deﬁned in Eqs. (5)-(6).
On the other hand, if w<C FB, the local lender’s credit decision is ineﬃcient: She rejects
projects with a low but positive NPV. The uniquely optimal ﬁnancial contract then stipulates
that the borrower pledges all of his assets as collateral, that is, C = w.18
Proposition 2 shows that there is a natural limit to how ﬂat the local lender’s payoﬀ function
will optimally be. Even in the ideal case in which the borrower has suﬃcient pledgeable assets
to attain the ﬁrst best, the local lender’s payoﬀ function is not completely ﬂat: Her payoﬀ
in the bad state is Rl = xl + CFB, which is strictly less than her payoﬀ in the good state,
Rh =( 1+rFB)k.19
3.4. Comparative static analysis
18The optimal loan rate r := Rh/k − 1 in case w<C FB is uniquely determined by the borrower’s binding
participation constraint (3) after inserting Rl = xl + w.
19The diﬀerence between the two payoﬀsi s
(1 + rFB)k − (xl + CFB)=k − xl − (xh − k)
U sFB
0 (µs − k)f(s)ds
U 1
sFB(µs − k)f(s)ds
,
which is strictly positive as xh >k>x l and µs − k>0 for all s>s FB while µs − k<0 for all s<s FB.
14Section 5 derives empirical implications regarding the role of imperfect loan market compe-
tition for collateral. In this section, we focus on a given borrower-lender relationship, that is,
holding loan market competition constant.
3.4.1. Collateral and credit likelihood
The ﬁrst implication follows directly from Propositions 1 and 2. Borrowers who can pledge
the ﬁrst-best collateral CFB have the highest acceptance likelihood, namely 1−F(sFB). In con-
trast, borrowers who because of binding wealth constraints can only pledge C = w<C FB have
a lower acceptance likelihood. Within the group of borrowers facing binding wealth constraints,
those who have more pledgeable assets have a higher acceptance likelihood; in other words,
1 − F(s∗) increases in C for all C<C FB.20
Corollary 1. Borrowers who can pledge more collateral are more likely to obtain credit.
Cole, Goldberg, and White (2004) analyze ﬁrm-level data from the 1993 National Survey of
Small Business Finances, which asks small businesses in the United States about their borrowing
experiences, including whether they have been granted or denied credit, and if so, under what
terms. Consistent with Corollary 1, they ﬁnd that collateral has a positive eﬀect on the likelihood
of obtaining credit.
Theoretical models of collateral typically assume that borrowers have unlimited wealth. A
notable exception is Besanko and Thakor (1987a). In their model, suﬃciently wealthy borrowers
obtain credit with probability one, while wealth-constrained borrowers face a positive probability
of being denied credit. In our model, all borrowers, including those with suﬃcient pledgeable
assets w ≥ CFB, face a positive probability of being denied credit.
3.4.2. Collateral and observable borrower risk
While borrowers do not have private information in our model, they may diﬀer in observable
characteristics. In what follows, we consider a mean-preserving spread in the project’s cash-ﬂow
distribution to examine diﬀerences in observable borrower risk.
Corollary 2. Observably riskier borrowers face higher collateral requirements. If they are unable
to pledge more collateral, they face a higher likelihood of being denied credit.
While the local lender receives the full project cash ﬂow xl (plus collateral) in the bad state,
her payoﬀ in the good state is capped at Rh =( 1+r)k. All else equal, that is, holding the
20This is shown in the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix B.
15loan rate and collateral requirement constant, the local lender’s expected payoﬀ thus decreases
after a mean-preserving spread. Most importantly, the local lender no longer breaks even at
the (previously) optimal cutoﬀ, implying that without any adjustment of the loan terms, the
optimal cutoﬀ must increase. By the same logic as in Propositions 1 and 2, the local lender
optimally responds by raising the collateral requirement.
Given the diﬃculty of ﬁnding a good proxy for observable borrower risk, empirical studies
have employed a variety of proxies. And yet, all of the studies ﬁnd a positive relation between
observable borrower risk and loan collateralization (Leeth and Scott, 1989; Berger and Udell,
1995; Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe, 2000; Jiménez, Salas, and Saurina, 2005). To our knowledge,
Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) are the only other theoretical model of collateral that considers
variations in observable borrower risk. As discussed in the Introduction, they too ﬁnd that
observably riskier borrowers may pledge more collateral and, moreover, that collateralized loans
may be riskier ex post, which is the issue we turn to next.
3.4.3. Collateral and ex-post default likelihood
That observably riskier borrowers pledge more collateral already implies that collateralized
loans have a higher ex-post default likelihood. Interestingly, this prediction follows from our
model even when we control for observable borrower risk. In our model, the average default
likelihood within the pool of accepted borrowers under a lenient credit policy (low s∗)i sh i g h e r
than it is under a conservative credit policy (high s∗). Formally, the average default likelihood
conditional on the borrower being accepted is
D :=
Z 1
s∗
(1 − ps)
f(s)
1 − F(s∗)
ds, (7)
where f(s)/[1−F(s∗)] is the density of s conditional on s ≥ s∗. Given that 1−ps is decreasing
in s, and given that s∗ is decreasing in the amount of collateral, an increase in collateral thus
implies a higher average default likelihood of accepted borrowers.
Corollary 3. Controlling for observable borrower risk, collateralized loans are more likely to
default ex post.
Corollary 3 is consistent with empirical evidence by Jiménez and Saurina (2004) and Jiménez,
Salas, and Saurina (2005), who ﬁnd that, controlling for observable borrower risk, collateralized
loans have a higher probability of default in the year after the loan was granted. Similarly,
Berger and Udell (1990), using past dues and non-accruals to proxy for default risk, ﬁnd that
collateralized loans are riskier ex post.
16As discussed in the Introduction, with the exception of Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991),
existing models of collateral generally predict that collateralized loans are safer, not riskier.
In adverse selection models (Bester, 1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1987; Besanko and Thakor,
1987a, 1987b), this is because safer borrowers can reveal their type by posting collateral. In
moral-hazard models (Chan and Thakor, 1987; Boot and Thakor, 1994), it is because collateral
improves the incentives of borrowers to work hard, which reduces their default likelihood.
4. Robustness
Thus far, we have assumed that the local lender has all of the ex-ante bargaining power.
Moreover, it has been assumed that the local lender’s decision to reject the borrower is ﬁnal and
not subject to renegotiations. In this section, we show that our results are robust to allowing
for bargaining at both the ex-ante and interim stages.
4.1. Ex-ante bargaining
Suppose that the local lender and the borrower bargain over the loan terms ex ante. Given
that there is symmetric information at this stage, it is reasonable to assume that they pick
a contract that lies on the Pareto frontier. Contracts on the Pareto frontier are derived by
maximizing the utility of one side, subject to leaving the other side a given utility. This is
precisely what we did when we maximized the local lender’s expected payoﬀ subject to leaving
the borrower a utility of V = V .B yv a r y i n gt h eb o r r o w e r ’ su t i l i t y ,w ec a nt r a c eo u tt h ee n t i r e
Pareto frontier U = u(V ).21 By Proposition 1, each point (U,V ) on the Pareto frontier is
associated with a uniquely optimal contract (r(V ),C(V )). Alternatively, we could solve the
dual problem in which the borrower’s expected payoﬀ is maximized, subject to leaving the local
lender a given reservation utility. The Pareto frontier would be the same.
As the borrower’s utility under ex-ante bargaining may exceed his outside option, we must
introduce some additional notation. Accordingly, let ˆ V =m a x {0,µ− k} denote the borrower’s
outside option from going to transaction lenders. The local lender’s outside option is zero.
Provided there exists a mutually acceptable contract, we assume that the solution is determined
by Nash bargaining, where b and 1 − b denote the borrower’s and the local lender’s respective
bargaining powers. The bargaining solution (U,V ) maximizes the Nash product (V − ˆ V )bU1−b =
21While the Pareto frontier is decreasing by construction, it is convenient to assume that it is smooth and
concave. A standard way to ensure concavity of the Pareto frontier is to allow lotteries over contracts.
17(V − ˆ V )b[u(V )]1−b, implying that the borrower’s expected utility V is the solution to
b
1 − b
= −u0(V )
V − ˆ V
u(V )
. (8)
Accordingly, the optimal ﬁnancial contract is obtained in precisely the same way as in Section
3, except that now V = V, where V is given by Eq. (8).
Proposition 3. Suppose that the local lender and the borrower can bargain over the loan terms
ex ante. Irrespective of the distribution of bargaining powers, the optimal ﬁnancial contract is
the same as in Proposition 1, except that V = V, where V is given by Eq. (8).
While bargaining does not aﬀect the qualitative properties of the optimal ﬁnancial contract, it
aﬀects the speciﬁc solution–the speciﬁc optimal loan rate and collateral requirement–implying
that we must modify Proposition 2 accordingly. If the borrower’s bargaining power is zero
(b → 0), we are back to the speciﬁc solution in Proposition 2. As the borrower’s bargaining
power increases, V increases correspondingly, implying that the borrower’s utility exceeds his
outside option. Generalizing Eq. (5) to arbitrary values of V ,w eo b t a i n
CFB :=
(k − xl)V
R 1
sFB(µs − k)f(s)ds
, (9)
which implies that the ﬁrst-best amount of collateral increases in V .I fb → 1, we obtain the other
polar case in which the borrower has all of the bargaining power. The optimal ﬁnancial contract
is then the solution to the speciﬁc dual problem in which the borrower makes a take-it-or-leave-
it oﬀer that maximizes his expected payoﬀ, subject to leaving the local lender a reservation
utility of zero. Interestingly, the local lender’s participation constraint in this case is slack: As
the local lender makes her credit decision under private information, she can always extract an
informational rent (see Section 3.2). This is diﬀerent from models in which the agency problem
lies with the borrower. In such models, if the borrower has all of the bargaining power or the
loan market is perfectly competitive, lenders generally make zero proﬁts.
4.2. Interim bargaining
We now reconsider our assumption that the local lender’s decision to reject the borrower is
ﬁnal and not subject to renegotiations. Clearly, if the borrower could observe the local lender’s
project assessment, any ineﬃciency would be renegotiated away. Precisely, if s ∈ [sFB,s ∗), the
local lender and the borrower would change the loan terms to allow the local lender to break
even. Given that the borrower cannot observe the local lender’s assessment, however, such a
18mutually beneﬁcial outcome may not arise. In fact, as we now show, the original loan terms will
not be renegotiated in equilibrium.
Consider the following simple renegotiation game. After the local lender has evaluated the
borrower’s project, either she or the borrower can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to replace the
original loans terms with new ones.22 If the local lender makes the oﬀer, the borrower must
agree; if the borrower makes the oﬀer, the local lender must agree. If the two cannot agree, the
original loan terms remain in place.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the local lender and the borrower can renegotiate the original loan
terms after the local lender has evaluated the borrower’s project. Regardless of who can make
the contract oﬀer at the interim stage, the original loan terms remain in place.
The intuition is straightforward. As only the local lender can observe s, the borrower does
not know whether s<s ∗ or s ≥ s∗. In the ﬁrst case, adjusting the loan terms to the local
lender’s beneﬁt would allow her to break even, avoiding an ineﬃcient rejection. However, in
the second case, the local lender would have accepted the project anyway. Adjusting the loan
terms would then merely constitute a wealth transfer to the local lender. By Proposition 4 ,
the expected value to the borrower from adjusting the loan terms, given that he does not know
whether s<s ∗ or s ≥ s∗,i sn e g a t i v e .
Finally, we ask whether it might ever be suboptimal to set the loan terms ex ante. That
is, would the local lender ever prefer to wait until after the project evaluation?23 The answer
is no. Suppose that the local lender waits until after the project evaluation. In this case, any
equilibrium of the signaling game in which the borrower is attracted must provide the borrower
an expected utility of at least V . Moreover, while waiting allows the local lender to ﬁne-tune
her oﬀer to the outcome of the project assessment, she can accomplish the same by oﬀering an
incentive-compatible menu of contracts ex ante from which she chooses at the interim stage. It
is easy to show that oﬀering such a menu is suboptimal in our model.24 Consequently, there is
22To the best of our knowledge, there exists no suitable axiomatic bargaining concept à la Nash bargaining to
analyze surplus sharing under private information–hence the restriction to the two polar cases in which either
the borrower or the local lender makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. Our results would be the same if the local lender
and the borrower could make alternating oﬀers, as long as there is no additional sorting variable.
23As the borrower has the same information ex ante and at the interim stage, he would make the same oﬀer in
τ =0and τ =1 .
24Intuitively, allowing the local lender to choose from a menu after the project evaluation creates a “self-dealing
problem,” as the local lender always picks the contract that is ex-post optimal for her. This makes it harder to
19no beneﬁt to the local lender from waiting with her oﬀer until after the project evaluation.
5. Imperfect loan market competition and collateral
Thus far we have focused on a given borrower-lender relationship, holding loan market compe-
tition constant. We now consider changes in loan market competition, examining how advances
in information technology that increase the competitive pressure from transaction lenders aﬀect
loan rates and collateral requirements.
5.1. Changes in the local lender’s information advantage
As discussed in the Introduction, one implication of the “information revolution” in small
business lending is that the information advantage of local lenders appears to have narrowed.
This is especially true since the 1990s, when small business credit scoring was adopted on a
broad scale in the United States.25 Small business credit-scoring models fairly accurately predict
the likelihood that a borrower will default based solely on hard information, especially credit
reports, thus reducing the information uncertainty associated with small business loans made to
borrowers located far away.26
To obtain a continuous yet simple measure of the local lender’s information advantage vis-à-
vis transaction lenders, we assume that it is now only with probability 0 <q≤ 1 that the local
lender has a better estimate of the project’s success probability. Our base model corresponds to
the case in which q =1 . As in our base model, we assume that only the local lender can observe
her actual success probability estimate. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 5. There exists a threshold b q such that borrowers for whom the local lender’s
information advantage is large (q ≥ b q) go to the local lender, while borrowers for whom the local
lender’s information advantage is small (q<b q) borrow from transaction lenders.
satisfy the borrower’s participation constraint, implying that the local lender’s privately optimal cutoﬀ s
∗ will be
strictly higher (and thus less eﬃcient) than under the single optimal contract from Proposition 2.
25The ﬁrst bank in the United States to adopt small business credit scoring was Wells Fargo in 1993, using
a proprietary credit-scoring model. Already in 1997, only two years after Fair, Isaac & Co. introduced the
ﬁrst commercially available small business credit-scoring model, 70% of the (mainly large) banks surveyed in
the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Oﬃcer Opinion Survey responded that they use credit scoring in their small
business lending (Mester, 1997).
26As Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley (2001) conclude, “credit scoring lowers information costs between bor-
rowers and lenders, thereby reducing the value of traditional, local bank lending relationships.”
20Conditional on going to the local lender (q ≥ b q), borrowers for whom the local lender’s infor-
mation advantage is smaller (lower q) face lower loan rates but higher collateral requirements.
Why is a small but positive information advantage not already suﬃcient to attract the bor-
rower?27 As in our base model, borrowers who are rejected by the local lender are unable to
obtain ﬁnancing elsewhere. Hence, from the borrower’s perspective, going to the local lender
and being rejected is worse than borrowing directly from transaction lenders. To attract the
borrower, the local lender must therefore oﬀer him a loan rate that is below the rate oﬀered
by transaction lenders, which implies that the local lender must create additional surplus. But
merely creating some additional surplus is not enough: As the local lender extracts an infor-
mational rent (see Section 3.2), she can only promise a fraction of the created surplus to the
borrower, implying that to attract the borrower, the additional surplus created by the local
lender must be suﬃciently large–that is, q must be suﬃciently high.
Before we link Proposition 5 to advances in information technology narrowing the local
lender’s information advantage, it is worth pointing out that Proposition 5 has cross-sectional
implications. Precisely, borrowers who borrow locally (q ≥ b q) and for whom the local lender’s
information advantage is relatively smaller (lower q) face lower loan rates but higher collateral
requirements. Intuitively, a decrease in q implies that the local lender creates less surplus by
screening out negative-NPV projects. Holding the loan rate constant, a decrease in q therefore
reduces the borrower’s expected payoﬀ, violating his (previously binding) participation con-
straint. To attract the borrower, the local lender must consequently oﬀer a lower loan rate. But
a lower loan rate implies that the borrower receives a larger share of the project cash ﬂows,
which in turn implies that the local lender must raise the collateral requirement to minimize
distortions in her credit decision.
As the sole role of collateral in our model is to minimize distortions in credit decisions
based on soft information, collateral has no meaningful role to play in loans underwritten by
transaction lenders. While the vast majority of small business loans in the United States are
collateralized (Avery, Bostic, and Samolyk, 1998; Berger and Udell, 1998), small business loans
made by transaction lenders on the basis of credit scoring are generally unsecured (Zuckerman,
1996; Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley, 2001; Frame, Padhi, and Woosley, 2004). Our model
also predicts that, within the group of borrowers who borrow locally, loans should be more
collateralized when the local lender’s information advantage is smaller. Consistent with this
27The threshold e q in Proposition 5 may not always lie strictly between zero and one. For instance, if µ−k ≤ 0,
the borrower’s outside option is zero, implying that the local lender can attract the borrower for all q>0.
21prediction, Petersen and Rajan (2002) ﬁnd that small business borrowers who are located farther
away from their local lender are more likely to pledge collateral. Proposition 5 is also consistent
with evidence by Berger and Udell (1995) and Degryse and van Cayseele (2000), who both ﬁnd
that longer borrower relationships are associated with less collateral.28
We can alternatively interpret Proposition 5 as a change in the local lender’s information
advantage for any given borrower. As discussed above, with the widespread adoption of small
business credit scoring since the 1990s, this information advantage appears to have narrowed.
According to Proposition 5, a narrowing of the local lender’s information advantage has two
eﬀects. First, marginal borrowers for whom the local lender has only a relatively small infor-
mation advantage switch to transaction lenders. Various studies document that transaction
lenders using small business credit scoring have successfully expanded their small business lend-
ing to borrowers outside of their own markets (Hannan, 2003; Frame, Padhi, and Woosley, 2004;
Berger, Frame, and Miller, 2005).29 Second, borrowers who continue to borrow from their local
lender face lower loan rates but higher collateral requirements. We are unaware of empirical
studies examining how the adoption of small business credit scoring has aﬀected the loan terms
in local lending relationships.
5.2. Changes in the costs of transaction lending
A second and perhaps more immediate implication of the “information revolution” in small
business lending is that the costs of underwriting transaction loans have decreased. Processing
costs for small business loans based on credit scoring have decreased considerably (Mester, 1997),
input databases for credit-scoring models have become larger, and credit reports can now be
sent instantly and at relatively low costs over the internet (DeYoung, Hunter, and Udell, 2004;
Berger and Frame, 2005).30
28These ﬁndings are consistent with our model to the extent that the local lender’s information advantage
increases with the length of borrower relationships. They are also consistent with Boot and Thakor (1994), who
model relationship lending as a repeated game, showing that collateral decreases with the duration of borrower
relationships.
29As Berger and Frame (2005) argue, “technological change–including the introduction of SBCS [small business
credit scoring]–may have increased the competition for small business customers and potentially widened the
geographic area over which these ﬁrms may search for credit. Presumably, a small business with an acceptable
credit score could now shop nationwide through the Internet among lenders using SBCS.”
30At the same time, there appears to be little evidence that advances in information technology have had a
signiﬁcant direct impact on relationship lending (DeYoung, Hunter, and Udell, 2004).
22To examine the implications of a decrease in the costs of transaction lending, we assume
that underwriting a transaction loan involves a cost of κ. As the market for transaction loans is
perfectly competitive, this cost is ultimately borne by the borrower, implying that the borrower’s
outside option from going to transaction lenders is now V =m a x {0,µ− k − κ}. If V =0 , a
change in κ has no eﬀect in our model. In the following, we thus focus on the interesting case
in which V = µ − k − κ>0.
As in the case of a decrease in q, a decrease in the costs of transaction lending implies that
the local lender loses marginal borrowers to transaction lenders. This is precisely what Boot and
Thakor (2000) show in their analysis of loan market competition between transaction lenders and
relationship lenders. What is less clear is to what extent a decrease in the costs of transaction
lending aﬀects collateral requirements. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 6. A decrease in the costs of transaction lending (lower κ) forces the local lender
to lower the loan rate and to increase the collateral requirement. The increase in collateral
requirement for a given decrease in κ is greater for borrowers for whom the local lender has a
smaller information advantage (lower q).
A decrease in the costs of transaction lending increases the value of the borrower’s outside
option, thus increasing the competitive pressure from transaction lenders. To attract the bor-
rower, the local lender must consequently lower the loan rate. As in the case of a narrowing
of the local lender’s information advantage, this implies that the local lender must raise the
collateral requirement to minimize distortions in her credit decision. The increase in collateral
requirement is greater for borrowers for whom the local lender has a relatively smaller informa-
tion advantage. The intuition is the same as that for why these borrowers face higher collateral
requirements in the ﬁrst place (see Proposition 5).
We are unaware of empirical studies investigating how changes in the costs of transaction
lending aﬀect the use of collateral in small business loans. There is, however, evidence that the
use of collateral increases with loan market competition, which is consistent with Proposition
6. Using Spanish data, Jiménez and Saurina (2004) and Jiménez, Salas, and Saurina (2005)
document a positive relation between collateral and bank competition, as measured by the
Herﬁndahl index. Moreover, Jiménez, Salas, and Saurina (2006) ﬁnd that the positive eﬀect
of bank competition on collateral decreases with the length of borrower relationships, which
is consistent with our argument if the local lender’s information advantage increases with the
duration of borrower relationships.
23To our knowledge, related models of imperfect loan market competition (Boot and Thakor,
2000; Hauswald and Marquez, 2003, 2005) do not consider collateral. On the other hand, theoret-
ical models of collateral do not consider imperfect loan market competition between arm’s-length
transaction lenders and local relationship lenders, thus generating empirical predictions that are
diﬀerent from this paper. For instance, Besanko and Thakor (1987a) and Manove, Padilla, and
Pagano (2001) both ﬁnd that collateral is used in a perfectly competitive loan market, but not in
a monopolistic one. Closer in spirit to our model, Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) consider
an oligopolistic loan market with horizontally diﬀerentiated banks, showing that collateral may
either increase or decrease as bank competition increases.
6. Conclusion
This paper oﬀers a novel argument for collateral based on the notion that collateral mitigates
distortions in credit decisions based on soft information. Our argument is entirely lender-based:
There is no borrower moral hazard or adverse selection.
In our model, there is a local relationship lender who has access to soft private information,
allowing her to estimate the borrower’s default likelihood more precisely than can transaction
lenders, who provide arm’s-length ﬁnancing based on publicly available information. While the
local lender has a competitive advantage, the competition from transaction lenders provides
the borrower with a positive outside option that the local lender must match. To attract the
borrower, the local lender must leave him some of the surplus from the project, which distorts
her credit decision so that she rejects marginally proﬁtable projects. Collateral improves the
local lender’s payoﬀ from projects with a relatively high likelihood of low cash ﬂows, and thus
from precisely those projects that she ineﬃciently rejects.
That the local lender’s credit decision is based on soft and private information is crucial for
the ineﬃciency studied here, and hence for our argument for collateral. If the information were
observable and contractible, the local lender could contractually commit to the ﬁrst-best credit
decision even if it meant committing to a decision rule that is ex-post suboptimal. Likewise, if
the information were observable but non-veriﬁable, the ineﬃciency could be eliminated through
bargaining at the interim stage.
Given that our model is cast as an imperfectly competitive loan market in which a local
lender has an information advantage vis-à-vis transaction lenders, we can draw implications
regarding the eﬀects of technological innovations that increase the competitive pressure from
transaction lenders. We ﬁnd that technological innovations that narrow the information advan-
24tage of local lenders, such as small business credit scoring, lead to lower loan rates but higher
collateral requirements (Proposition 5). Likewise, innovations that lower the costs of underwrit-
ing transaction loans lead to greater competition from transaction lenders, lower loan rates, and
higher collateral requirements (Proposition 6). The increase in collateral requirements is greater
for borrowers for whom the local lender has a weaker information advantage, such as borrowers
who are located farther away from the local lender, or borrowers with whom the local lender
has had no prior lending relationship (Proposition 6).
In addition to generating implications regarding loan market competition, our model also has
implications for a given borrower-lender relationship, holding loan market competition constant.
We ﬁnd that borrowers who can pledge more collateral are more likely to obtain credit (Corollary
1), that observably riskier borrowers face higher collateral requirements (Corollary 2), and that–
controlling for observable borrower risk–collateralized loans are more likely to default ex post
(Corollary 3). All three predictions are borne out in the data. What is more, existing models of
collateral, with the exception of Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991), generally make the opposite
prediction, namely, that collateralized loans are safer, not riskier.
Appendix A. Continuum of cash ﬂows
This section shows that our argument for why collateral is optimal extends to a continuum
of cash ﬂows. Unlike the two cash-ﬂow model in the main text, it shows both that collateral is
used only in low cash-ﬂow states, and how precisely repayments are made out of the pledged
assets as a function of the project’s cash ﬂow when cash ﬂows are continuous.
We assume that the project cash ﬂow x is distributed with atomless distribution function
Gs(x) over the support X := [0,x],w h e r ex>0 may be ﬁnite or inﬁnite. The density gs(x)
is everywhere continuous and positive. In case x is inﬁnite, we assume that µs :=
R
X xgs(x)dx
exists for all s ∈ [0,1].W em o r e o v e ra s s u m et h a tGs(x) satisﬁes the Monotone Likelihood Ratio
Property (MLRP), which states that for any pair (s,s0) ∈ S with s0 >s ,the ratio gs0(x)/gs(x)
strictly increases in x for all x ∈ X.
A ﬁnancial contract speciﬁes a repayment schedule t(x) ≤ x out of the project’s cash ﬂow,
an amount C ≤ w of collateral, and a repayment schedule c(x) ≤ C out of the pledged assets.
It is convenient to write R(x): =t(x)+c(x). We make the standard assumption that R(x)
is non-decreasing for all x ∈ X (e.g., Innes, 1990). The local lender’s and borrower’s expected
payoﬀsa r eUs(R): =
R
X R(x)gs(x)dx, Vs(R): =µs −Us(R), U(R): =
R 1
s∗ [Us (R) − k]f(s)ds and
V (R): =
R 1
s∗ Vs(R)f(s)ds, respectively. Analogous to the analysis in the main text, the local
25lender’s privately optimal cutoﬀ s∗ is given by Us∗(R)(R)=k. The local lender’s problem is to
maximize U(R), subject to the borrower’s participation constraint V (R) ≥ V .
The following result extends Proposition 1 to the case with a continuum of cash ﬂows.
Proposition. The optimal ﬁnancial contract when there is a continuum of cash ﬂows stipulates
ar e p a y m e n tR ∈ (0,x) and an amount of collateral C ∈ (0,w], so that the local lender receives
R(x)=x + C if x ≤ R and R(x)=R if x>R .
As far as the repayment out of the project’s cash ﬂow is concerned, we have t(x)=x for
x ≤ R and t(x)=R for x>R . Collateral is used as follows: If x ≤ R − C, the local lender
receives the entire collateral, that is, c(x)=C;i fR − C<x≤ R, the local lender receives a
fraction c(x)=R − x of the pledged assets (after liquidation); and if x>R ,the local lender
receives no repayment out of the pledged assets, because the project’s cash ﬂow is suﬃcient to
make the contractually stipulated repayment.
To prove the proposition, suppose to the contrary that the optimal contract stipulated a
repayment schedule R(x) diﬀerent from the one in the proposition. We can then construct a
new repayment schedule e R(x)=m i n {x + e C, e R}, where e C = w, and where e R satisﬁes
Z 1
s∗(R)
∙Z
X
z(x)gs(x)dx
¸
f(s)ds =0 ,( 1 0 )
with z(x): =e R(x)−R(x). That is, holding the local lender’s cutoﬀ ﬁxed at s∗(R), all expected
payoﬀs remain unchanged.31 By construction of e R(x), there exists a value 0 < e x<x such that
z(x) ≥ 0 for all x<e x and z(x) ≤ 0 for all x>e x, where the inequalities are strict on a set of
positive measure.
Claim 1. s∗(e R) <s ∗(R).
Proof. By Eq. (10) and continuity of gs(x) in s, there exists a value e s satisfying s∗(R) < e s<1,
where
R
X z(x)gh s(x)dx =0 .F r o me s>s ∗(R) and MLRP, it follows that gs∗(R)(x)/gh s(x) is strictly
decreasing in x so that
Z
X
z(x)gs∗(R)(x)dx =
Z
x≤h x
z(x)gh s(x)
gs∗(R)(x)
gh s(x)
dx +
Z
x>h x
z(x)gh s(x)
gs∗(R)(x)
gh s(x)
dx
>
gs∗(R)(e x)
gh s(e x)
Z
X
z(x)gh s(x)dx =0 .
31Existence and uniqueness of a value h R solving Eq. (10) follows as the local lender’s payoﬀ is continuous and
strictly increasing in h R for a given cutoﬀ, and as the left-hand side of Eq. (10) is strictly positive at h R = x and
strictly negative at h R =0 .
26Given that
R
X z(x)gs∗(R)(x)dx > 0 and
R
X R(x)gs∗(R)(x)dx = k from the deﬁnition of s∗(R),w e
have that
R
X
e R(x)gs∗(R)(x)dx > k.A sUs(e R) is strictly increasing in s, we have that s∗(e R) <
s∗(R). ¤
The new cutoﬀ s∗(e R) may lie below sFB. In this case, we can make the following adjustment:
Claim 2. In case s∗(e R) <s FB for e C = w, we can adjust the new contract by decreasing e C and
increasing e R, so that Eq. (10) continues to hold, while s∗(e R)=sFB.
Proof. Take ﬁrst a contract (b R, b C) such that b R>e R and b C<e C and Eq. (10) holds with
z(x): =b R(x) − e R(x). From Eq. (10), together with b R>e R and b C<e C, it follows that there
exists a value 0 < e x<x such that z(x) ≥ 0 for all x>e x and z(x) ≤ 0 for all x<e x,w h e r et h e
inequalities are strict on a set of positive measure. By the argument in Claim 1, this implies
that s∗(b R) >s ∗(e R). As we decrease b C and adjust b R accordingly to satisfy Eq. (10), we have
from the deﬁnition of s∗ and continuity of gs(x) that s∗(b R) increases continuously. Given that
s∗(b R) >s FB at b C =0 , the claim follows immediately. ¤
We show next that the borrower is not worse oﬀ under the new contract (e R, e C).
Claim 3. V (e R) ≥ V (R).
Proof. We must distinguish between three cases.
Case 1. s∗(R)=sFB. The claim follows immediately from Eq. (10) and s∗(R)=s∗(e R).
Case 2. s∗(R) >s FB. In this case, it follows from the construction of e R(x) that sFB ≤ s∗(e R) <
s∗(R) and that the borrower’s expected payoﬀ remains unchanged if he is accepted if and only
if s ≥ s∗(R). Hence, V (e R) ≥ V (R) follows if Vs(e R) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ [s∗(e R),s ∗(R)].T os e et h i s ,
note ﬁrst that Vs∗(h R)(e R) ≥ 0 since Us∗(h R)(e R)=k and sFB ≤ s∗(e R). It remains to show that
Vs(e R) is non-decreasing in s. Partial integration yields
Vs(e R)=
Z x
h R−h C
[1 − Gs(x)]dx − e C, (11)
where MLRP implies that Gs(x) is strictly decreasing in s for all 0 <x<x. By Eq. (11), this
implies that Vs(e R) is strictly increasing in s.
Case 3. s∗(R) <s FB. In this case, it follows from the construction of e R(x) that s∗(e R)=sFB.
It remains to show that Vs(e R) ≤ 0 for all s ∈ [s∗(e R),s FB].F r o ms∗(e R)=sFB,i m p l y i n gt h a t
27UsFB(e R)=0 , it follows that VsFB(e R)=0 , while the argument in Case 2 implies that Vs(e R) is
non-decreasing in s. Together, this implies that Vs(e R) ≤ 0 for all s ∈ [s∗(e R),s FB]. ¤
In sum, we have constructed a new contract (e R, e C) with the following characteristics: i)
e R(x)=m i n {x+ e C, e R}; ii) Eq. (10) is satisﬁed; iii) if s∗(R) ≥ sFB, it holds that sFB ≤ s∗(e R) ≤
s∗(R), where s∗(e R) <s ∗(R) if s∗(R) >s FB;i v )i fs∗(R) <s FB, it holds that s∗(R) <s ∗(e R)=
sFB;v )V (e R) ≥ V (R). The new contract satisﬁes the borrower’s participation constraint, while
the local lender is not worse oﬀ. In fact, she is strictly better oﬀ if s∗(e R) 6= s∗(R),w h i c h
follows immediately from Eq. (10) and the optimality of s∗. Finally, if the original contract
implements the ﬁrst best, that is, if s∗(e R)=s∗(R)=sFB, then the repayment out of the
pledged assets is strictly lower under the new contract, that is,
R 1
sFB
£R
X c(x)gs(x)dx
¤
f(s)ds >
R 1
sFB
£R
X e c(x)gs(x)dx
¤
f(s)ds. ¤
Appendix B. Proofs
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .Suppose to the contrary that the project’s NPV conditional upon rejection
were positive, that is, suppose that
Z s∗
0
(µs − k)
f(s)
F(s∗)
ds > 0.( 1 2 )
This immediately implies that µ−k>0: If the project’s unconditional NPV were non-positive,
its NPV conditional upon rejection would have to be negative. Given that transaction lenders
are perfectly competitive, a rejected borrower obtains (12) in τ =1when seeking funding from
transaction lenders. In τ =0 , the borrower’s expected payoﬀ from going to the local lender is
consequently Z 1
s∗
[µs − Us (Rl,R h)]f(s)ds +
Z s∗
0
(µs − k)f(s)ds, (13)
while his payoﬀ from going to a transaction lender is µ − k>0. Requiring that the expression
in Eq. (13) is equal to or greater than µ − k a n du s i n gt h ef a c tt h a tµ =
R 1
0 µsf(s)ds yields the
requirement that Z 1
s∗
[Us (Rl,R h) − k]f(s)ds ≤ 0,
which contradicts the fact that Us (Rl,R h) >kfor all s>s ∗. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n s1a n d2 .It is convenient to prove the two propositions together. As
t h ec a s ei nw h i c hV =0is obvious, we focus on the nontrivial case in which V> 0.T om a k et h e
dependency of s∗ on Rl and Rh explicit, we write s∗ = s∗(Rl,R h). The following observations
28are all obvious. First, if we increase Rl while holding Rh constant, U(Rl,Rh) increases while
s∗(Rl,R h) decreases. Second, if we increase Rh while holding Rl constant, U(Rl,R h) increases
while s∗(Rl,R h) decreases. Third, s∗(Rl,R h) is continuous in both Rl and Rh,i m p l y i n gt h a t
V (Rl,Rh) and U(Rl,R h) are also both continuous.
The following two auxiliary results simplify the analysis.
Claim 1. Take two contracts (Rl,R h) and (e Rl, e Rh) with e Rl >R l and e Rh <R h. If the local
lender’s optimal cutoﬀ is the same under both contracts, that is, if s∗(Rl,R h)=s∗(e Rl, e Rh),t h e n
Vs(e Rl, e Rh) >V s(Rl,R h) for all s>s ∗.
Proof. Since s∗(Rl,R h)=s∗(e Rl, e Rh)=s∗, we have that Us∗(e Rl, e Rh)=Us∗(Rl,R h) and
therefore that Vs∗(e Rl, e Rh)=Vs∗(Rl,R h). Given that e Rh − e Rl <R h − Rl and
Vs(e Rl, e Rh) − Vs(Rl,R h)=( Rl − e Rl)+ps[(Rh − Rl) − (e Rh − e Rl)],
that ps is strictly increasing in s implies that Vs(e Rl, e Rh)−Vs(Rl,R h) must be strictly increasing
in s. In conjunction with Vs∗(e Rl, e Rh)=Vs∗(Rl,R h), this implies that Vs(e Rl, e Rh) >V s(Rl,R h)
for all s>s ∗. ¤
Claim 2. Take two contracts (Rl,R h) and (e Rl, e Rh),w h e r e e Rl >R l and e Rl < e Rh <R h satisfy
Z 1
s∗(Rl,Rh)
[Vs(e Rl, e Rh) − Vs(Rl,R h)]f(s)ds =0 .( 1 4 )
That is, holding the cutoﬀ ﬁxed at s∗(Rl,R h), the borrower’s (and thus also the local lender’s)
expected payoﬀs are the same under the two contracts. It then holds that s∗(e Rl, e Rh) <s ∗(Rl,R h).
Proof. We can transform Eq. (14) to
Z 1
s∗(Rl,Rh)
[ps[(Rh − Rl) − (e Rh − e Rl)] − (e Rl − Rl)]
f(s)
1 − F(s∗)
ds =0 . (15)
As ps is strictly increasing in s and Rh − Rl > e Rh − e Rl by construction, Eq. (15) implies that
ps∗(Rl,Rh)[(Rh − Rl) − (e Rh − e Rl)] − (e Rl − Rl) < 0,
and therefore that Vs∗(Rl,Rh)(e Rl, e Rh) <V s∗(Rl,Rh)(Rl,R h).S i n c e Us∗(Rl,Rh)(Rl,R h)=k from
the deﬁnition of s∗(Rl,R h), this implies that Us∗(Rl,Rh)(e Rl, e Rh) >k .A s Us(e Rl, e Rh) is strictly
increasing in s and Us∗(h Rl,h Rh)(e Rl, e Rh)=k from the deﬁnition of s∗(e Rl, e Rh),t h i si m p l i e st h a t
s∗(e Rl, e Rh) <s ∗(Rl,R h). ¤
29We now prove the claim in Proposition 1 that the optimal contract is unique, and that it has
a positive amount of collateral in the low cash-ﬂow state, that is, Rl >x l, where Rl−xl ∈ (0,w].
That Rh <x h follows trivially from the borrower’s participation constraint (3): If Rl >x l but
Rh ≥ xh, the borrower would not break even. We prove the claim separately for the case in
which (Rl,Rh) is ﬁrst-best optimal, that is, s∗(Rl,R h)=sFB (Case 1), and the case in which
(Rl,Rh) is second-best optimal, that is, s∗(Rl,R h) >s FB (Case 2). In Case 2, we speciﬁcally
prove that Rl = xl + w, as asserted in Proposition 2. We ﬁnally show that it cannot be true
that s∗(Rl,R h) <s FB.
Case 1. Suppose that under the optimal contract (Rl,R h) it holds that s∗(Rl,R h)=sFB. We
then have from Eqs. (1) and (2) that
k − Rl
Rh − Rl
=
k − xl
xh − xl
, (16)
which uniquely pins down Rh for a given value of Rl.A sw ei n c r e a s eRl while decreasing Rh to
satisfy Eq. (16), we know from Claim 1 that Vs(Rl,R h) increases for all s>s ∗(Rl,R h)=sFB.
Consequently, V (Rl,R h) also increases. The requirement that s∗(Rl,R h)=sFB, in conjunction
with the fact that Eq. (3) holds with equality, thus pins down a unique pair (Rl,R h).I t
remains to show that Rl >x l.I f Rl = xl, Eq. (16) would imply that Rh = xh and thus that
V (Rl,R h)=0 , violating Eq. (3). By Claim 1, any lower value Rl <x l (together with Rh >x h
t os a t i s f yE q .( 1 6 ) )w o u l di m p l ya ne v e nl o w e rv a l u eo fV (Rl,R h) and therefore also violate Eq.
(3).
Case 2. Suppose that under the optimal contract (Rl,R h), it holds that s∗(Rl,R h) >s FB.
We ﬁrst show that in this case, it must hold that Rl = xl + w. We argue to a contradiction
and assume that Rl <x l + w. We can then construct a new contract (e Rl, e Rh) with e Rl >R l
and e Rl < e Rh <R h that satisﬁes Eq. (3) and is preferred by the local lender, contradicting the
optimality of (Rl,R h). We construct (e Rl, e Rh) as follows. Starting from e Rl = Rl and e Rh = Rh, we
continuously increase e Rl and decrease e Rh so that Eq. (14) in Claim 2 holds. From Claim 2, we
then know that s∗(e Rl, e Rh) <s ∗(Rl,R h), while s∗(e Rl, e Rh) decreases continuously as we increase
e Rl and decrease e Rh.W ec o n t i n u et oi n c r e a s ee Rl and decrease e Rh until one of the following two
conditions is satisﬁed. Either the borrower’s wealth constraint binds, that is, e Rl = xl +w (Case
2i), or it holds that s∗(e Rl, e Rh)=sFB (Case 2ii).32
32In Case 2i, it holds that s
∗(h Rl, h Rh) ≥ sFB. It does not matter whether we subsume the case in which
h Rl = xl + w and s
∗(h Rl, h Rh)=sFB hold jointly under Case 2i or Case 2ii.
30We now show that the local lender prefers (e Rl, e Rh) to (Rl,R h), and that (e Rl, e Rh) satisﬁes the
borrower’s participation constraint (3). The ﬁrst claim is obvious. The local lender’s expected
payoﬀ under (e Rl, e Rh) is
Z 1
s∗(h Rl,h Rh)
[Us(e Rl, e Rh) − k]f(s)ds
=
Z s∗(Rl,Rh)
s∗(h Rl,h Rh)
[Us(e Rl, e Rh) − k]f(s)ds +
Z 1
s∗(Rl,Rh)
[Us(e Rl, e Rh) − k]f(s)ds
>
Z 1
s∗(Rl,Rh)
[Us(Rl,R h) − k]f(s)ds,
which follows from s∗(e Rl, e Rh) <s ∗(Rl,R h), the fact that(e Rl, e Rh) and (Rl,R h) satisfy Eq. (14),
implying that
R 1
s∗(Rl,Rh) [Us(Rl,R h) − k]f(s)ds =
R 1
s∗(Rl,Rh)[Us(e Rl, e Rh) − k]f(s)ds, and the fact
that Us(e Rl, e Rh) >kfor all s>s ∗(e Rl, e Rh) from the deﬁnition of s∗(e Rl, e Rh).
It remains to show that (e Rl, e Rh) satisﬁe s E q .( 3 ) .B e c a u s e (Rl,R h) satisﬁes Eq. (3) by
construction–it is assumed to be the optimal contract–and (e Rl, e Rh) satisﬁes Eq. (14), (e Rl, e Rh)
satisﬁes Eq. (3) if Vs(e Rl, e Rh) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ [s∗(e Rl, e Rh),s ∗(Rl,R h)). To see that this condition
is satisﬁed, note ﬁrst that Vs∗(h Rl,h Rh)(e Rl, e Rh) ≥ 0 as Us∗(h Rl,h Rh)(e Rl, e Rh)=k from the deﬁnition
of s∗(e Rl, e Rh) and µs∗(h Rl,h Rh) ≥ k due to s∗(e Rl, e Rh) ≥ sFB.I t t h e r e f o r e s u ﬃces to show that
Vs(e Rl, e Rh) is non-decreasing in s. Given that ps is increasing in s,t h i si st r u ei f
xh − e Rh ≥ xl − e Rl. (17)
To see that Eq. (17) holds, consider ﬁrst Case 2i, in which e Rl = xl + w. Because (e Rl, e Rh)
satisﬁes Eq. (14) and (Rl,R h) satisﬁes Eq. (3), the fact that e Rl = xl+w necessarily implies that
e Rh <x h, which in turn implies that Eq. (17) holds with strict inequality. Consider next Case
2ii, in which s∗(e Rl, e Rh)=sFB (while e Rl ≤ xl + w), implying that UsFB(e Rl, e Rh)=µsFB. If it
was true that e Rh− e Rl ≥ xh−xl,w ew o u l dh a v eUs(e Rl, e Rh) ≥ µs for all s ≥ sFB, and hence also
for all s ≥ s∗(Rl,R h), contradicting the fact that (e Rl, e Rh) satisﬁes Eq. (14) in conjunction with
t h ef a c tt h a t(Rl,R h) satisﬁe sE q .( 3 ) .I tm u s tc o n s e q u e n t l yb et r u et h a te Rh − e Rl <x h − xl,
implying that Eq. (17) holds with strict inequality.
Finally, because Rl = xl + w, the repayment in the high cash-ﬂow state is uniquely pinned
down: It is the maximum feasible value of Rh at which the borrower’s participation constraint
(3) binds. (Existence follows from continuity of all payoﬀsi nRh.)
Case 3. We ﬁnally show that it cannot be true that s∗(Rl,R h) <s FB. As the argument is
analogous to that in Case 2, we will be brief. Suppose to the contrary that s∗(Rl,R h) <s FB.B y
31Claim 2, we can then construct a new contract(e Rl, e Rh) with e Rl <R l and e Rh >R h such that Eq.
(14) holds, while s∗(Rl,R h) <s ∗(e Rl, e Rh) ≤ sFB.( I nf a c t ,a s(Rl,R h) is feasible by construction,
that s∗(Rl,R h) <s FB implies the existence of a contract(e Rl, e Rh) with s∗(e Rl, e Rh)=sFB.) By
construction, the local lender is again strictly better oﬀ under (e Rl, e Rh), while according to
Eq. (14) the borrower is not worse oﬀ if Vs(Rl,R h) ≤ 0 under the original contract for all
s ∈ [s∗(Rl,R h),s ∗(e Rl, e Rh)), which follows immediately as µs <kand Us(Rl,R h) >kfor all
s∗(Rl,R h) <s<s FB.
In sum, we have shown that the optimal contract (Rl,R h) is unique, that it satisﬁes xl <
Rl <R h <x h, and that s∗(Rl,R h) ≥ sFB. In the second-best case s∗(Rl,R h) >s FB, we have
additionally shown that Rl = xl + w. That the second-best case applies whenever w<C FB
follows immediately from the construction of CFB. ¤
Proof of Corollary 2. We consider a mean-preserving spread in the project’s cash-ﬂow dis-
tribution. Denote the cash ﬂows and the success probability after the increase in risk by ˆ xl, ˆ xh,
and ˆ ps for all s ∈ S,w h e r eˆ xl <x l and ˆ xh >x h. To preserve the mean, the success probability
must change from ps =
µs−xl
xh−xl to ˆ ps =
µs−ˆ xl
ˆ xh−ˆ xl, while sFB remains unchanged. Note that
ps − ˆ ps =
µs[(ˆ xh − ˆ xl) − (xh − xl)] + ˆ xlxh − xlˆ xh
(xh − xl)(ˆ xh − ˆ xl)
(18)
is strictly increasing in s because µs is strictly increasing and ˆ xh − ˆ xl >x h −xl. Finally, denote
the optimal contracts before and after the increase in risk by (r, C) and (ˆ r, ˆ C), respectively, and
the associated optimal cutoﬀsb ys∗ and ˆ s∗, respectively.
We ﬁrst consider the case in which s∗ =ˆ s∗ = sFB.T oi m p l e m e n tt h eﬁrst best, it must hold
that
k(1 + r)=
k − (1 − psFB)(C + xl)
psFB
. (19)
Note that 1 − ps =
xh−µs
xh−xl and ps/psFB =
µs−xl
µsFB−xl. Using these expressions together with Eq.
(19), we obtain
Us =( 1− ps)(xl + C)+psk(1 + r)=
1
k − xl
(µs [k − (xl + C)] + kC). (20)
Note that [k − (xl + C)]/(k − xl) is strictly decreasing in both xl and C.U s i n gE q .( 2 0 ) ,t h e
requirement that s∗ =ˆ s∗ = sFB transforms to
1
k − xl
(µsFB[k − (xl + C)] + kC)=
1
k − ˆ xl
(µsFB[k − (ˆ xl + ˆ C)] + k ˆ C). (21)
32Moreover, for the borrower’s participation constraint to hold with equality both before and after
the increase in risk, the local lender’s expected payoﬀ must satisfy
Z 1
sFB
∙
1
k − xl
[µs [k − (xl + C)] + kC]
¸
f(s)ds (22)
=
Z 1
sFB
∙
1
k − ˆ xl
[µs[k − (ˆ xl + ˆ C)] + k ˆ C]
¸
f(s)ds.
As µs is strictly increasing, Eqs. (21) and (22) can be jointly satisﬁed only if
k − (xl + C)
k − xl
=
k − (ˆ xl + ˆ C)
k − ˆ xl
,
which, given that ˆ xl <x l, implies that ˆ C>C .
We next consider the case in which s∗ >s FB and ˆ s∗ >s FB,i m p l y i n g t h a tC = ˆ C = w by
Proposition 2. We show that this implies that ˆ s∗ >s ∗. We argue to a contradiction and assume
that ˆ s∗ ≤ s∗. Consider the contract (e r,w) that prior to the increase in risk implements e s∗ =ˆ s∗,
that is,
pˆ s∗[k(1 + e r) − w − xl]+( w + xl)=ˆ pˆ s∗[k(1 + ˆ r) − w − ˆ xl]+( w +ˆ xl). (23)
Using the deﬁnition of µs, we can rewrite Eq. (23) as
pˆ s∗[xh − k(1 + e r)+w] − w =ˆ pˆ s∗[ˆ xh − k(1 + ˆ r)+w] − w. (24)
We now show that under (e r,w), the borrower’s participation constraint (3) would be slack.
Consequently, the local lender could increase e r, thereby pushing e s∗ strictly below ˆ s∗–and since
ˆ s∗ ≤ s∗ also strictly below s∗–until (3) binds.33 But this would imply that, prior to the
increase in risk, there existed a contract that satisﬁed the borrower’s participation constraint
and implemented a strictly lower cutoﬀ than (r,w), contradicting the optimality of (r,w).T h e
borrower’s participation constraint is slack under (e r,w) if
Z 1
ˆ s∗
[ps(xh − k(1 + e r)+w) − w]f(s)ds (25)
>
Z 1
ˆ s∗
[ˆ ps(ˆ xh − k(1 + ˆ r)+w) − w]f(s)ds = V,
where the equality follows from the fact that the participation constraint binds under (ˆ r,w).
But Eq. (25) is implied by Eq. (24) and the fact that ps − ˆ ps is strictly increasing in s.
Finally, note that we have from Eq. (5) that ˆ CFB >C FB due to ˆ xl <x l. Hence, the only
remaining case is that in which C = ˆ C = w and ˆ s∗ >s ∗ = sFB. ¤
33Existence of such a contract follows from continuity of the borrower’s payoﬀ in h r. N o t et h a tw en e e do n l y
consider a marginal adjustment, thereby ensuring that the resulting cutoﬀ does not fall below sFB.
33P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .We ﬁrst prove an auxiliary result.
Claim. Take any contract (Rl,R h) with Rl = xl + w and Rh >R l and a diﬀerent contract
(e Rl, e Rh) 6=( Rl,R h) satisfying Vs(e Rl, e Rh) ≤ Vs(Rl,R h) for some s = e s<1. It holds that
Vs(e Rl, e Rh) <V s(Rl,R h) (and therefore that Us(e Rl, e Rh) >U s(Rl,R h)) for all s>e s.
Proof. We can rewrite the condition that Vs(e Rl, e Rh) ≤ Vs(Rl,R h) at s = e s as
(e Rl − Rl)+ps[(e Rh − e Rl) − (Rh − Rl)] ≥ 0. (26)
Since Rl = xl + w, we have that e Rl − Rl ≤ 0. Hence, for Eq. (26) to hold, it must be true that
e Rh − e Rl ≥ Rh − Rl.T h e r ea r et w oc a s e s :i )I fe Rl = Rl, then Eq. (26) and e Rh 6= Rh together
imply that e Rh >R h, and therefore that (e Rh − e Rl) − (Rh − Rl) > 0; ii) if e Rl <R l, it follows
directly from Eq. (26) that (e Rh − e Rl)−(Rh −Rl) > 0.G i v e nt h a tps is strictly increasing in s,
this implies that, in either case, Vs(e Rl, e Rh) <V s(Rl,R h) for all s>e s. ¤
We can restrict ourselves to the case s∗ >s FB, which, by Proposition 2, implies that Rl =
xl + w. Suppose ﬁrst that the borrower makes a new oﬀer (e Rl, e Rh).F o r t h i s o ﬀer to be
proﬁtable for the borrower, it must hold that s∗(e Rl, e Rh) ≤ s∗(Rl,R h). By the deﬁnition of
s∗(e Rl, e Rh), this implies that k = Us∗(h Rl,h Rh)(e Rl, e Rh) >U s∗(h Rl,h Rh)(Rl,R h) and therefore that
Vs∗(h Rl,h Rh)(e Rl, e Rh) ≤ Vs∗(h Rl,h Rh)(Rl,R h). By Claim 1, it then follows that Vs(e Rl, e Rh) <V s(Rl,R h)
and therefore that Us(e Rl, e Rh) >U s(Rl,R h) for all s>s ∗(e Rl, e Rh). Hence, the local lender prefers
(e Rl, e Rh) to (Rl,R h) for all s>s ∗(e Rl, e Rh), and thus even for values s ≥ s∗(Rl,R h) for which
she would have accepted the borrower under the original contract (Rl,R h). Consequently, the
local lender’s new expected payoﬀ is U(e Rl, e Rh) >U(Rl,R h), while the borrower’s new expected
payoﬀ is V (e Rl, e Rh).A s(Rl,R h) maximizes the local lender’s expected payoﬀ subject to leaving
the borrower exactly V, this immediately implies that the borrower’s expected payoﬀ under
(e Rl, e Rh) is V (e Rl, e Rh) <V(Rl,R h)=V , which in turn implies that oﬀering (e Rl, e Rh) cannot be
proﬁt a b l ef o rt h eb o r r o w e r .T h ea r g u m e n tf o rt h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h el o c a ll e n d e rm a k e san e w
oﬀer, which results in a signaling game, is analogous. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . Before we can prove Proposition 5, we must ﬁrst verify that some
key results from our base model extend to the setting in Section 5. We ﬁrst extend the argument
from Lemma 2.
Claim 1. For any q>0, borrowers who are initially attracted by the local lender but rejected
after the project evaluation cannot obtain ﬁnancing elsewhere.
34Proof. Recall that it is now only with probability q>0 that the local lender has a more precise
estimate ps of the project’s success probability, while with probability 1 − q her estimate is the
same as that of the transaction lenders, namely, p. Moreover, our assumption that only the local
lender can observe her own success probability estimate implies that only she knows whether
her estimate is more precise.
The expected NPV of a project that has been rejected by the local lender depends, among
other things, on the local lender’s decision in case she does not observe s.A s c a n b e e a s -
ily shown, if the local lender is then indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting the project,
then under the optimal contract, she must accept with probability one. To see this, note
ﬁrst that
R 1
0 Us(Rl,Rh)f(s)ds = k, where substituting Us(Rl,Rh)=µs − Vs(Rl,Rh) yields
R 1
0 Vs(Rl,Rh)f(s)ds = µ − k>0. Suppose now that under the optimal contract (Rl,Rh), the
local lender randomizes between accepting and rejecting if she is indiﬀerent and does not observe
s. But since
R 1
0 Vs(Rl,Rh)f(s)ds > 0, the borrower’s participation constraint could be relaxed if
the local lender accepted with probability one, implying that there exists another contract with
a higher repayment that satisﬁes the borrower’s participation constraint with equality while
making the local lender strictly better oﬀ, contracting the optimality of (Rl,Rh).
We ﬁrst consider the case in which the local lender accepts the borrower if she does not
observe s. We argue to a contradiction and assume that a borrower who is initially attracted
by the local lender but then rejected can obtain funding from transaction lenders, that is,
R s∗
0 (µs − k)
f(s)
F(s∗)ds > 0. The borrower’s expected payoﬀ is then
q
"Z 1
s∗
[µs − Us (Rl,R h)]f(s)ds +
Z s∗
0
(µs − k)f(s)ds
#
(27)
+(1 − q)
Z 1
0
[µs − Us (Rl,R h)]f(s)ds.
The requirement that the expression in (27) be greater than or equal to µ−k>0 transforms to
q
Z 1
s∗
[k − Us (Rl,R h)]f(s)ds ≥ (1 − q)
Z 1
0
[Us (Rl,R h) − k]f(s)ds. (28)
But the fact that the local lender accepts the borrower if she does not observe s implies that
R 1
0 Us (Rl,R h)f(s)ds ≥ k, which, in conjunction with Us (Rl,R h) >kfor all s>s ∗, violates Eq.
(28).
We next consider the other case in which the local lender accepts the borrower only if she
35observes s and if s ≥ s∗. Again, we argue to a contradiction and assume that
(1 − q)(µ − k)+q
R s∗
0 (µs − k)f(s)ds
(1 − q)+qF(s∗)
> 0, (29)
that is, we assume that the expected NPV conditional on being rejected by the local lender is
positive, implying that a rejected borrower can obtain funding from transaction lenders. The
borrower’s expected payoﬀ is then
q
Z 1
s∗
[µs − Us (Rl,R h)]f(s)ds +( 1− q)(µ − k)+q
Z s∗
0
(µs − k)f(s)ds. (30)
The requirement that the expression in (30) be greater than or equal to µ−k>0 transforms to
Z 1
s∗
[Us (Rl,R h) − k]f(s)ds < 0,
which is again violated as Us(Rl,R h) >kfor all s>s ∗. ¤
Given Claim 1, the borrower’s expected payoﬀ in case the local lender accepts him if she
does not observe s is
V (Rl,R h): =q
Z 1
s∗
Vs(Rl,R h)f(s)ds +( 1− q)
Z 1
0
Vs(Rl,R h)f(s)ds, (31)
while the borrower’s expected payoﬀ in case the local lender rejects him if she does not observe
s is
V (Rl,R h): =q
Z 1
s∗
Vs(Rl,R h)f(s)ds. (32)
The local lender’s problem is to maximize
U(Rl,Rh): =q
Z 1
s∗
[Us (Rl,R h) − k]f(s)ds +( 1− q)max{0,
Z 1
0
[Us (Rl,R h) − k]f(s)ds}, (33)
which accounts for the optimality of the local lender’s credit decision, subject to the borrower’s
participation constraint V (Rl,R h) ≥ V = µ − k. By standard arguments, the borrower’s
participation constraint must bind at the optimum.
We now show that the results from Propositions 1 and 2, which characterize the optimal
contract if the borrower’s participation constraint can be satisﬁed, straightforwardly extend to
the current setting.
Claim 2. P r o p o s i t i o n s1a n d2e x t e n dt ot h em o d e li nS e c t i o n5 ,w i t ht h es i n g l eq u a l i ﬁcation
that the deﬁnition of CFB changes to
CFB =
(k − xl)(µ − k)
q
R 1
sFB(µs − k)f(s)ds +( 1− q)(µ − k)
. (34)
36Proof. W eb e g i nw i t ht h ed e ﬁnition of CFB.N o t eﬁrst that we can again use the fact that
Vs(Rl,R h)=CFB
µs − k
k − xl
, (35)
which is obtained by substituting s∗ = sFB and the deﬁnition of psFB in Eq. (1). Observe next
that, given that µ−k>0, we have that psFB >
R 1
0 psf(s)ds such that UsFB(Rl,R h)=k implies
that
R 1
0 Us(Rl,R h)f(s)ds > k. In other words, if the ﬁrst best is attainable, then the local lender
accepts the borrower if she does not observe s. We then obtain Eq. (34) from the borrower’s
binding participation constraint, where we use V (Rl,Rh) as deﬁned in Eq. (31). Finally, the
repayment in the good state, Rh = k(1 + rFB), is still uniquely determined by Eq. (6), though
we can now substitute CFB from Eq. (34). Accordingly, for all w ≥ CFB, the optimal contract
is unique and implements the ﬁrst-best credit decision.
We next turn to the case in which the ﬁrst best is not attainable, that is, s∗(Rl,Rh) >s FB.
Here, the key argument in the proof of Propositions 1 and 2 was that if the (alleged) optimal
contract (Rl,Rh) does not have the properties asserted in the propositions, then one can construct
a ﬂatter contract (e Rl, e Rh) that satisﬁes the borrower’s participation constraint while making the
local lender strictly better oﬀ. Recall from Claim 1 that if the lender is indiﬀerent between
accepting and rejecting if she does not observe s, then under the optimal contract (Rl,R h),
she must accept with probability one. This in turn implies that if the local lender rejects the
borrower under the optimal contract (Rl,Rh) if she does not observe s, then she must strictly
prefer to do so. Because all payoﬀs are continuous, the arguments in the proof of Propositions
1 and 2 fully extend to the current case. (We only need to multiply all expected payoﬀsb yq.)
We next consider the case in which under (Rl,R h) the local lender accepts the borrower if
she does not observe s. The arguments from the proof of Proposition 1 and 2 also extend to this
case, albeit with some minor modiﬁcations. Note ﬁrst that Claim 1 clearly extends, as it only
concerns Vs(·). We next show that Claim 2 also extends. Given some (Rl,R h) with Rl <x l+w,
we choose (e Rl, e Rh) with e Rl >R l and e Rh <R h such that
q
Z 1
s∗(Rl,Rh)
h
Vs(e Rl, e Rh) − Vs(Rl,R h)
i
f(s)ds (36)
+(1 − q)
Z 1
0
h
V (e Rl, e Rh) − Vs(Rl,R h)
i
f(s)ds =0 .
In words, if under (e Rl, e Rh) the cutoﬀ s∗ remains unchanged, and if the borrower is accepted if
the local lender does not observe s, then the borrower’s expected payoﬀ under (e Rl, e Rh) is the
37same as it is under (Rl,R h). We next show that s∗(e Rl, e Rh) <s ∗(Rl,R h).C l e a r l y ,t h i si st r u ei f
ps∗(Rl,Rh)[(Rh − Rl) − (e Rh − e Rl)] − (e Rl − Rl) < 0,
which, substituting from Eq. (36) and using the fact that e Rl − Rl > 0 and Rh − Rl > e Rh − e Rl,
holds if
ps∗(Rl,Rh) <q
Z 1
s∗(Rl,Rh)
psf(s)ds +( 1− q)
Z 1
0
psf(s)ds. (37)
Given that Us(Rl,R h) is strictly increasing in s and Us∗(Rl,Rh)(Rl,R h)=k,t h ef a c tt h a t
R 1
0 Us(Rl,Rh)f(s)ds ≥ k–as the local lender accepts the borrower if she does not observe s–
implies that
R 1
0 psf(s)ds ≥ ps∗(Rl,Rh). Together with the fact that ps is strictly increasing, this
yields (37). It remains to show that under (e Rl, e Rh) it is indeed true that the local lender accepts
the borrower if she does not observe s. Given that it is true under (Rl,R h), it is certainly true
if
R 1
0 Us(e Rl, e Rh))f(s)ds >
R 1
0 Us(Rl,R h)f(s)ds,t h a ti s ,i f
[(Rh − Rl) − (e Rh − e Rl)]
Z 1
0
psf(s)ds < e Rl − Rl,
which is implied by Eq. (37).
Having extended Claim 2 from the proof of Propositions 1 and 2, the rest of the argument
is straightforward. Under the optimal contract, it cannot be the case that s∗ <s FB.T h e
argument in Case 2 of the proof of Propositions 1 and 2, in which s∗(Rl,R h) >s FB, proceeds
again by contradiction, using the usual construction of a ﬂatter contract (e Rl, e Rh).T h e o n l y
deviation from the original argument is that now (e Rl, e Rh) must satisfy the modiﬁed requirement
in Eq. (36). ¤
We can now ﬁnally prove Proposition 5. The local lender is able to attract the borrower if
there exists a contract such that the borrower’s expected payoﬀ V (Rl,R h) is at least V = µ−k.
Formally, the local lender can attract the borrower if and only if
max
Rl,Rh
V (Rl,Rh) ≥ µ − k. (38)
We ﬁrst show that the left-hand side of Eq. (38) is strictly increasing in q, which establishes
the existence of a unique cutoﬀ b q ∈ [0,1]. Clearly, this is the case if, holding (Rl,R h) ﬁxed,
V (Rl,R h) is increasing in q. If V (Rl,Rh) is determined by Eq. (32), this is obviously true.
Suppose next that V (Rl,R h) is determined by Eq. (31). Diﬀerentiating V (Rl,R h) with respect
to q shows that the borrower’s expected payoﬀ is increasing in q if
Z s∗
0
Vs(Rl,R h)f(s)ds ≤ 0. (39)
38Using the fact that k ≥ µ − V (Rl,Rh) in conjunction Eq. (31), the condition that the local
lender accepts the borrower if she does not observe s transforms to q
R s∗
0 Vs(Rl,R h)f(s)ds ≤ 0,
which in turn implies that (39) is satisﬁed.
We next consider how the uniquely optimal contract varies with q for q ≥ b q.F r o m t h e
deﬁnition of CFB in Eq. (34), we know that if s∗ = sFB is feasible for some q0 < 1,t h e ni ti s
also feasible for all higher q>q 0. Moreover, by Eq. (34), the corresponding optimal contract
prescribes for all q>q 0 a strictly lower collateral requirement CFB, which must be matched by
an increase in rFB to preserve s∗ = sFB.
We ﬁnally consider the case in which the ﬁrst best cannot be attained. From our previous
arguments, we know that as q increases conditional on q ≥ b q, the borrower’s expected payoﬀ
must increase correspondingly for any given contract, irrespective of whether the local lender
accepts or rejects the borrower if she does not observe s. If under the previously optimal
contract the local lender at least weakly prefers to accept the borrower if she does not observe s,
then following a marginal increase in r, she does so strictly. From continuity of the borrower’s
expected payoﬀ, this implies that following an increase in q, the local lender optimally raises
the loan rate r (while leaving C = w, as s∗ >s FB). The argument is the same if under the
previously optimal contract, the local lender strictly prefers to reject the borrower if she does
not observe s, implying that she still does so after a marginal increase in r. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . It is straightforward to extend the argument from the proof of
Proposition 5 to show that
CFB :=
(k − xl)(µ − k − κ)
q
R 1
sFB(µs − k)f(s)ds +( 1− q)(µ − k)
, (40)
which is strictly decreasing in κ.34 Consequently, if the competitive pressure from transaction
lenders increases (lower κ), the optimal collateral requirement increases correspondingly. Of
course, rFB must decrease. If the ﬁrst best cannot be attained, implying that C = w, it follows
immediately that r must decrease, which in turn implies that s∗ must increase.
As for the second part of the claim, diﬀerentiating Eq. (40) with respect to q and κ,w h i l e
noting that
R 1
sFB(µs − k)f(s)ds > µ − k from the deﬁnition of sFB, yields d2CFB/dqdκ > 0.O f
c o u r s e ,i ft h eﬁrst best is unattainable, we invariantly have that C = w. ¤
34This condition is obtained from inserting V (Rl,R h)=q
U 1
s∗ Vs(Rl,R h)f(s)ds +( 1− q)
U 1
0 Vs(Rl,R h)f(s)ds
and Vs(Rl,R h)=CFB
µs−k
k−xl , where the latter condition follows from s
∗ = sFB, into the binding participation
constraint V (Rl,R h)=µ − k − κ.
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